













Many  risky  actions  are  carried  out  under  the  influence  of  alcohol.  However,  the  effect  of 
alcoholic intoxication over the willingness to take risks is complex and still remains unclear. 
We conduct an economic field experiment in a natural, drinking and risk‐taking environment 
to  analyze  how  both  actual  and  self‐estimated  blood  alcohol  concentration  (BAC)  levels 
influence subjects’ choices over monetary lotteries. Our results reveal a negative impact of 
both  actual  and  self‐estimated  BAC  levels  on  risk‐taking.  However,  for  male  and  young 
subjects,  we  find  a  positive  relationship  between  BAC  underestimation  (a  pattern  of 
estimation  error  which  mainly  occurs  at  high  BAC  levels)  and  the  willingness  to  choose 
riskier  lotteries. Our findings suggest that a risk compensation mechanism is activated only 
when  individuals’  own  intoxication  level  is  consciously  self‐perceived  to  be  high.  We 
conclude therefore that human propensity to engage  in risky activities under the  influence 
of  alcohol  is  not  due  to  an  enhanced  preference  for  risky  choices.  In  addition  to  the 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and  health  implications  have  attracted  the  research  interests  of  many  scholars. 
During  the  last  five  decades, many  studies  have  been  carried  out  in  this  realm.  A 
great deal of attention has focused on the visible effect of alcoholic intoxication on 
risky  and  hazardous  behaviors  like  criminal  or  aggressive  activities  (Ensor  and 
Godfrey 1993; Lau et al. 1995; Richardson and Budd 2003), dangerous/risky driving 
patterns (Burian et al. 2003; Russ et al. 1988; Beirness 1987), risky sexual behavior 




leaving  other  important  aspects  related  to  short‐term,  post‐consumptive  behavior 
uninvestigated.  One  of  such  crucial  parameters  is  the  perception  individuals  hold 
about  their  own  alcoholic  intoxication  levels;  a  psychological  component  that  has 
not  been  studied  in  depth  so  far.  A  second  characteristic,  emanating  from  their 
focus,  is  the  methodology  used  in  these  studies.  Traditionally,  research  on  the 
effects  of  alcohol  ingestion  is  carried  out  through  laboratory‐based  experiments 
(Meier  et  al  1996;  Lane  et  al.  2004;  Breslin  et  al.  1999).  However,  the  behavioral 
effects of alcohol undoubtedly arise from other dimensions of its consumption other 
than simple pharmacological effects. For  instance, the psychological and emotional 
state  of  drinkers,  the  social  as  well  as  the  physical  environment,  or  the  laws  and 
social  norms  governing  a  given  occasion  are  all  inseparable  from  alcohol‐related 
behavioral patterns. Finally, when investigating the causal effects of alcohol on risky 
behavior,  studies  have  used  a  wide  range  of  risk‐taking  measures.  Nevertheless, 
previous research has fallen short of distinguishing between how alcohol affects risk 
preferences  on  the  one  hand,  and  risk  perceptions  (Weber  1997)  or  abilities/skills 
(Byrnes 1998) on the other.  




level  (Beirness  1987).  We  then  analyzed  separately  how  each  measure  affects 
subjects’ risk‐taking behavior in a lottery task designed specifically for this purpose, 
which was free of both cognitive complexity and subjective perceptions of risk. 
Although  there  is  ample  epidemiological  and  clinical  evidence  linking  risky 
behaviors  to  the effects of alcoholic  intoxication  (Cherpitel 1999; Testa and Collins 
1997;  Donovan  and  Marlatt  1982;  Ferguson  and  Horwood  2000),  the  exact 
relationship between alcohol and risk‐taking at the individual level remains unclear. 
Experimental  results  exploring  such  a  relationship  have  been  inconclusive.  For  the 
time being, we know that alcohol induces maladaptive risky decision‐making due to 
an  impaired  evaluation  of  the  consequences  of  the  existing  alternatives/choices 
(Kyngdon and Dickerson 1999; Euser et al. 2011; Fromme et al. 1997; George et al. 
2005; Lane et al. 2004). 
Lane  et  al.  (2004)  found  that  an  incorrect  response  to  previous  monetary 
losses  led  intoxicated  individuals (two groups, reaching about 0.4g/L and 0.8 g/L of 
BAC)  to choose more  risky options despite being  linked  to  long‐run  losses.  In  their 









To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  no  alcohol‐related  study  has  tackled  the 
question of whether  intoxication promotes human preference  for  risky choices per 
se–  that  is,  the  taste  for  choices  which,  not  being  less  adaptive  than  others,  are 
simply riskier  in terms of greater outcome variance.  If this  is the case, then alcohol 
intake would trigger risk‐taking in two different ways: intoxicated individuals would 
(i) misevaluate the negative consequences involved in risky choices (Lane et al. 2004; 




(1996)  and  Breslin  et  al.  (1999)  for  intoxicated  subjects  carrying  out  repeated 
gambling  tasks  with  known  probabilities  and  fluctuant  adaptiveness  of  risk.  Even 
more, it has been shown that intoxicated individuals, for instance, take a longer time 
to  complete  the  “Stroop’s  color  and  word”  cognitive  test  (Stroop  1935)  and  thus 
keep the number of errors low (Gustafson and Källmén 1990). Along the same line, 
individuals  perform  better  on  a  tracking  task  when  expecting  alcohol  than  when 
expecting  placebo  after  having  received  the  same  alcoholic  dose  (Finnigan  1995). 
These  last  observations  indicate  that  a  similar  compensation  process  might  lead 
humans  to  attenuate  the  harmful  effects  of  alcohol  in  decision‐making  under  risk 
when  high  intoxication  is  correctly  self‐estimated  (as  suggested  by  Burian  et  al. 
2003).  Such  a  process would  develop  an  aversion  to more  volatile,  riskier  choices 
when options are perceived as identically adaptive. 
We therefore hypothesize that, apart from the actual  intoxication  level, what 
may  also  be  driving  risky  behavior  is  the  drinker’s  self‐perceived  intoxication  level 
and  probably  the  comparative  relationship  between  the  two  as  well.  In  the  DUI 
(Driving  Under  the  Influence)  paradigm  for  instance,  high  levels  of  ethanol  in  the 
driver’s  blood  are  likely  to  impair  his  perceptual  and  psychomotor  skills  (reflexes, 
attention, and reaction time) (Mitchell 1985; Moskovitz and Robinson 1988). At the 
same  time,  what  the  driver  expects  about  the  level  of  his  intoxication  and  the 
impairment of both his  skills  and  judgment might  also  crucially  affect his behavior 
(McMillen  and  Wells‐Parker  1987).  It  is  therefore  possible  that  the  level  of 
under/overestimation of own intoxication represents a crucial parameter influencing 
risky  decision  making.  Even  though  self‐perception  of  alcoholic  intoxication  has 
featured  in  the  research agenda of clinical  researchers,  inquiries have been mainly 
conducted  using  the  placebo  effect  treatment  (Ross  and  Pihl  1989;  Marlatt  and 
Rohsenow 1980). The implementation of a laboratory driving task using expectancy 
deception  procedures  by  Burian  et  al.  (2003)  is  a  representative  example  of  this 
methodology. The present  study, however,  is  the  first  to explore  the  link between 
self‐estimated  intoxication  and  risk  preferences,  and  measure  how  individuals’ 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under/overestimations  of  their  actual  alcoholic  intoxication  levels  influence 
behavior.  
Also  novel  is  the  field  methodology  we  employed.  Indeed,  the  sterile 
environment  of  the  laboratory  does  not  provide  for  the  relevant  conditions  and 
relationships found in the real world and thus excludes their scientific study (Thombs 
et  al.  2003).  It  is  known  that  the  field  poses  several  restrictions  on  the  level  of 
control  over  the phenomenon at  study. However,  looking  at  the other  side of  the 
same  coin,  along  with  new  methodologies,  new  directions  and  opportunities  for 
research  arise.  During  the  last  years,  within  the  relatively  newly‐born  field  of 
experimental  economics,  field  experiments  are  accelerating  in  frequency.  These 
experiments are aiming at the higher external validity of results and capturing critical 
environmental effects absent in laboratories (Harrison and List 2004). Applied to the 
present  study  field,  economic  experimental  methodology  offered  important 
advantages over classical  laboratory experiments:  (i)  experimental  subjects did not 
self‐select in the study; (ii) demand effects were minimized, regarding the subjects’ 
concern of being enrolled  in  an experiment on  the effects of  alcohol or  substance 
intake;  (iii)  alcohol  consumption  was  done  prior  to  the  study  with  absolutely  no 
involvement of the researchers; (iv) alcohol consumption and risk‐taking took place 
in  an environment where  such behaviors  are more natural;  and  (v) according  to  a 






























€60.1  From  a  total  of  73  participation  requests,  71  individuals  responded 
affirmatively  and  were  finally  recruited2;  a  fact  that  removes  any  kind  of  self‐
selection  bias  concerns.  First  stage  instructions  were  given  by  the  principal 
interviewer  to groups of  at most  three  individuals. However,  all  participants made 





weight,  age,  gender,  drinking  habits  (average  number  of  standard  drink  units  per 
drinking  occasion),  use  of  marijuana  (within  the  last  three  hours),  and  previous 
experience  with  alcohol  measurement  (number  of  times  subjects  had  previously 
used an alcoholmeter). Up to this point, subjects had no clue that the research focus 
                                                






of  this  study was alcohol  intake;  this  prevented any experimental  demand effects. 
Soon  after  completing  the  questionnaire  and  before  implementing  the  lottery, 
subjects were asked whether they would like to participate in another (surprise) task 
which  offered  the  possibility  of  earning  an  additional  €5  if  they  correctly  guessed 
their BAC levels. After accepting to participate, all 71 subjects received the additional 
information  on  this  extra  task  and  subsequently  made  estimations  of  their  BAC 
levels. The experimental process ended with the subject’s actual BAC measurement, 
















final  sample was  comprised of  individuals  having  consumed  from  zero  up  to  large 
amounts  of  alcohol,  who,  moreover,  had  done  so  on  their  own  and  prior  to  any 
knowledge of participation in a study. The highest BAC levels present in our sample 






to develop naturally  in a way that  the  laboratory would not. To  further  investigate 
the role of the environment on behavioral expressions, we ran two separate sessions 






lack of  information  regarding  the  time and  the general  conditions  surrounding  the 
subject’s alcohol consumption. However, BAC levels obtained from breath samples is 
probably the most reliable and realistic measure of alcoholic intoxication in the field, 







winning  probabilities  but  to  the  same  expected  value.  Table  1  presents  the main 
characteristics of the six lotteries. Starting with the zero‐risk lottery (100% of earning 
€10)  on  the  left  of  the  table, winning  probabilities  gradually  decrease  in  a  simple 
fashion as we move to the right. In contrast to other alcohol‐risk studies (Lane et al. 
2004; Kyngdon and Dickerson 1999; Euser et al. 2011; Fromme et al. 1997; George et 
al.  2005),  in  this  task  risk  taking  is  not maladaptive;  the  expected  value  across  all 
lotteries  is purposely kept constant at €10 by  increasing the potential prize  in each 
lottery in proportion to the risk increase.  
Our lottery‐task is a simpler and more visual version of the risk‐taking measure 
by  Sabater‐Grande  and  Georgantzís  [36]  (setting  r=0)3.  Risk‐taking  increases  along 
with the probability assigned to the less favorable payoff, which is always zero. Thus, 
choosing the lot‐60 corresponds to higher risk‐taking behavior (in ordinal rather than 






lot‐60,  but  higher  compared  to  persons  who  choose  lot‐40  or  less.  Obviously, 
choosing lot‐10 is considered the least risk‐taking behavior. 
In  designing  the  lottery‐choice  task,  we  responded  to  a  tradeoff  between 
richness  of  information  of  subjects’  risk  preferences  and  simplicity.  Especially  in  a 




Lotteries  were  represented  by  six  different  boxes  (Figure  S2)  with  visible 
colored  balls  inside.  Every  box  contained  one winning,  yellow  ball  and  a  different 
number of non‐winning, pink balls. Lot‐10 contained no pink balls, lot‐20 contained 
only one, and lot‐30 contained two pink balls and so on until  lot‐60, with five non‐
winning,  pink  balls.  Each  participant  had  to  select  one  box.  The  content  of  the 
selected  box  was  dropped  into  an  opaque  bag,  from  which  the  participant  was 
allowed to pick only one ball that determined the lottery’s final outcome. 
 
Lottery  10  20  30  40  50  60 
Probability  100%  50%  33%  25%  20%  17% 
Prize  10  20  30  40  50  60 





This  game‐like  task  was  selected  due  to  its  visual  simplicity  and  its 
appropriateness  to  the  festive  environment  hosting  our  study.  Special  care  was 
taken to ensure the ease of comprehensibility of the task by presenting the winning 
probabilities  and  natural  frequencies  in  an  easily  visible  way.  In  this  way,  we 
managed  to  factor out any  subjective effect  related  to  individuals’  risk perception. 
Moreover, contrary to other risk‐taking measures such as driving tasks (e.g., Mitchell 
1985; Moskovitz  and  Robinson  1988)  or more  complex  lotteries  (e.g., Meier  et  al. 
 10 
1996; Breslin et al. 1999),  subjects’  cognitive abilities or  skills  should not  influence 
decision making. 
According  to  standard  practices  in  experimental  economics,  the  task  was 
monetarily  incentivized  procuring  dominance,  monotonicity  and  saliency  (Induced 
Value  Theory,  Smith  1976).  Incentive  compatibility  ensures  that  subjects  truthfully 





The  surprise  BAC  self‐estimation  (eBAC  henceforth)  task  took  place  upon 
agreement by the subjects after completion of the questionnaire and before taking 
the BAC measurement. BAC was measured in g/L using an ACE‐AL 6000 breathalyzer 
after  subjects  rinsed  their  mouth  with  mineral  water  for  30  seconds.  In  order  to 
induce  common  information  and  reference  points  about  alcoholic  intoxication 
measurement  across  subjects,  we  informed  participants  (i)  that  the  maximum 
permitted BAC when driving  is 0.5 g/L under  the Spanish  traffic  law;  (ii)  about  the 
official correspondence between a unit of alcoholic drink (beer) and its effect on the 
BAC  of  an  average  weighted  male  or  female4;  and  (iii)  that  BAC  depends  on 
individuals’  weight,  the  time‐gap  between  alcohol  consumption  and  BAC 
measurement and the food ingested.  
Monetary  incentives were also introduced in this task. Subjects would win an 
additional  €5  note  if  they  were  able  to  approximate  their  actual  BAC  within  an 
allowed  deviation  of  ±0.1  g/L.  Given  the  existing  incentive  for  accuracy  and  the 
information  tips  provided,  and  after  controlling  for  subjects’  experience  with  an 
alcoholmeter, subjects’ significant deviations from the actual BAC should be mainly 
driven  by  their  self‐perceived  intoxication  level  due  to  alcohol  intake.  Beirness 
(1987)  has  reported  that  individuals  who  self‐estimate  lower  levels  of  BAC 
                                                
4Depending on the subject’s gender, one of the following hints were given (according to the Spanish 











We  first  implemented  non‐parametric  tests  to  highlight  any  interesting 
differences among individuals and sessions. Moreover, in order to study the impact 
of  alcohol  over  risk  taking, we  controlled  for  such  differences  through  an  ordered 
logistic  regression.  The  fact  that  our  dependent  variable  –  subjects’  lottery  choice 
(10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60) – is both discrete and ordinal justifies the adequacy of such a 





The  sample  under  examination  consists  of  70  subjects5  (40  males)  aged 
between 18 and 59. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the participants in each 
experimental  session  and  identifies  significant  differences  between  sessions 
obtained  through  a  Mann‐Whitney  test.  Participants  in  the  family  session  were 
significantly younger (P<0.05) and the reported BACs (P<0.01), eBACs (P<0.05), and 
drinks  consumed  per  drinking  occasion  (P<0.05)  were  significantly  lower.  As 
expected,  different  experimental  sessions  were  associated  with  different  drinking 





















































TOTAL 70 57.14 
(±0.60) 
28.21    
(±0.91) 












experimental  session. Age,  BMI,  eBAC  and  alcohol  habits  are  self‐reported  variables.  The 
variable alcohol habits  indicates the number of drinks consumed per drinking occasion. **, 





them declared  no  alcoholic  intake  prior  to  the  start  of  the  experiment. Maximum 
values  for BAC and eBAC were 1.8 g/l and 2.5 g/l,  respectively. We  found a strong 
positive  correlation  between  BAC  and  eBAC  for  both  the  whole  sample  (ρ=0.73, 
P<0.01) and the subsample of subjects who declared having drunk alcohol before the 
experiment  (ρ=0.54, P<0.01, n=55). However,  in  line with previous  studies on  self‐




lines  is  around  0.82  g/l.  Hence,  for  BACs  lower  than  0.82  g/l  subjects  tended  to 
overestimate  their  intoxication  level,  whereas  they  underestimated  it  for  BACs 
above that value6. Similar results were obtained for the subsample of subjects (n=55) 
who declared having ingested alcohol prior to the experiment (blue line). 
                                                
6However,  quadratic  OLS  regression  supports  the  existence  of  a  concave  relationship  between  the 





Figure  2.  Lowess  smoother  of eBAC  as  function  of  BAC. Red 
and  blue  lines  represent  locally  weighted  regression  of  eBAC 
on  BAC  for  the  whole  sample  and  for  the  subsample  with 





success  higher  than  1/4  –  i.e.  lotteries  10,  20,  and  30.  The  distribution  of  lottery 
choices  is  illustrated  in  Figure  3.  Table  3  shows  the  impact  of  alcohol‐related 
variables  over  risk‐taking.  We  present  coefficients  estimated  by  ordered  logistic 




to  have  a  similar  influence  over  the  dependent  variable  (P<0.05)  (column  2).  The 
models in columns 4 and 5 depict significant interactions of BAC and eBAC with the 
other explanatory variables, respectively7. As model 4 shows, only the interaction of 
BAC with  gender  significantly  influences  the  dependent  variable  (P<0.05).  A Wald 
test supported that the negative impact of BAC over lottery choice is significant for 
females  (P<0.01)  but  not  for males  (P>0.8).  The  interaction  of  eBAC with  gender, 
                                                
7 The remaining possible interactions were not significant at conventional levels (Ps>0.1). Models with 
interaction terms are replicated with OLS methodology due to the complexity of nonlinear marginal 
effects  in  logistic  regressions  with  interactions  (Ai  and  Norton  2003).  OLS  regressions  yield  similar 
main results (upon request). 
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on  the  dependent  variable  (columns  3  and  6),  we  reduced  the  sample  to  those 
subjects who declared having drunk alcohol before participating  in our experiment 
(n=55).  Note  that  this  subsample  also  includes  subjects  (n=11)  who  declared  a 




1.8,  0.8] with  43.64%  of  subjects  actually  underestimating  their  own  BAC  (that  is, 
with  underBAC>0).  Although  we  found  no  significant  effect  of  underBAC  over  the 
willingness to choose riskier lotteries (column 3), the interactions of underBAC with 
both  gender  (P<0.05)  and  age  (P<0.01)  yielded  significant  estimates  (column  6).  A 
positive and significant effect of underestimation over  the willingness  to  take  risks 
for  young  male  subjects  under  30  years  old  (n=23)  was  confirmed  using  the 
appropriate Wald tests (all Ps<0.05). On the contrary, the effect of underestimation 
over risk taking was negative and significant for female subjects over 33 years old (all 
Ps<0.05),  although  very  few  observations  (n=5)  satisfied  this  condition.
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Ordered Logistic Regressions 
Dep. Variable: Main effects models Interaction effects models 
Lottery choice (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BAC -1.301** (0.586)   
-2.388*** 
(0.784)   
eBAC  -1.212** (0.578)   
-6.6*** 
(2.126)  
underBAC   0.383 (0.534)   
7.709** 
(3.26) 
BAC x male    2.579** (1.127)   
eBAC x age     0.172*** (0.065)  
underBAC x male      3.055** (1.516) 
underBAC x age       -0.3*** (0.109) 











































































Party ses. x male     -2.283** (1.15)  
-2.251* 
(1.311) 
observations 70 70 55 70 70 55 
LR (chi2) 21.28*** 21.25** 22.75*** 28.14*** 29.77*** 38.05*** 
pseudo R2 0.0926 0.0925 0.1261 0.1225 0.1296 0.211 
 
Table  3:  The  impact  of  BAC  and  self‐estimated BAC over  the willingness  to  take  risk. 
Standard errors  in  brackets.  *,  **,  ***  indicate  significance  at  the 0.10,  0.05,  and 0.01 
levels, respectively. Models 3 and 6 depicting the effect of underBAC are reduced to the 
subsample  of  subjects  who  declared  having  ingested  alcohol  before  the  experiment. 
Regressions  including  eBAC  and  underBAC  are  additionally  controlled  for  subject’s 
experience  with  the  alcoholmeter.  Due  to  the  reduced  sample  size,  age  squared  and 
interactions between variables are excluded from those models in which their estimates 
are not significant in order to maximize the degrees of freedom of the models.  In Table 
S1,  regressions  2,  3,  5,  6  are  repeated,  excluding  eBAC’s  outliers.  No  important 
differences were observed on the basic regressors. 
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When  performing  an  OLS  regression  on  the  continuous  dependent  variable 
underBAC  (see  Table  S2) we  found  that  for  each  level  of  BAC,  younger  individuals 
underestimate  their  own  BAC  level  to  a  marginally  significant  higher  extent 
(P=0.075) than older ones. Following the same methodology and splitting the sample 
by gender, we realized that the impact of youth on underestimation was significant 
only  for male  subjects  (P<0.05, n=34).  Therefore,  young male  subjects were more 
likely  to  underestimate  their  own  intoxication  levels  and  to  consequently  increase 
risk taking than female ones. Moreover, we found that non‐heavy drinking males – 
as  measured  by  the  number  of  drinks  per  drinking  occasion  –  tended  to 
underestimate  their  own  BAC  level  (P=0.055).  On  the  other  hand,  no  significant 
predictors of underestimation were found for females. 
With regards to the control variables used in the previous logistic models, we 
can make  the  following  comments.  Firstly,  unlike  previous  studies  (e.g.,  Anderson 







be  in  line  with  the  literature  asserting  that  females’  attitude  toward  risk  is  more 
context‐dependent  than  that of males  (Croson and Gneezy 2009).  In  this  vein,  the 
affect state triggered by the party environment of the nocturnal session and the one 
activated during the evening session seem to generate two different contexts for risk 
taking  (Arkes  et  al.  1988;  Isen  and  Patrick  1983;  Kahn  and  Isen  1993; Moore  and 
Chater 2003).  
Finally, we  found  that  subjects’  BMI  and  alcohol  habits  (drinks  per  occasion) 
had a weak impact on the lottery choices for some models. The former was related 
positively and the latter negatively to the dependent variable. No main or interaction 
effect  of  marijuana  use  was  found.  It  must  be  said,  nevertheless,  that  this 
experiment was not designed  to explore  relationships other  than  those associated 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While  most  studies  agree  that  alcohol  consumption  is  associated  with  risky 





alcoholic  exposure  are  due  to  an  enhanced  preference  for  riskier  choices  in 
concomitance  with  the  impaired  ability  to  perceive  risks  and/or  to  evaluate  the 
possible negative consequences associated with  those behaviors  (Lane et al. 2004; 
Kyngdon and Dickerson 1999; Euser et al. 2011; Fromme et al. 1997; George et al. 
2005).  On  the  other  hand,  we  still  do  not  know  whether  it  is  only  the 
pharmacological  effect  of  alcohol  intake  or  also  a  psychological  component which 
influences alcohol‐related risky behaviors. So far the role of important psychological 
factors  around  the  alcohol‐risk  relationship  remains  surprisingly  unexplored. 
Concretely,  how  high  an  individual  perceives  his  own  intoxication  has  not  been 
deeply investigated as a factor intimately linked to risk‐taking.  
In this study, we report the results of an economic field experiment designed 
to  study  the  effect  of  alcoholic  intoxication  over  risk‐taking  in  three  different 
dimensions:  we  separately  analyze  how  subjects’  actual  BAC,  self‐estimated  BAC, 
and  over/underestimation  of  own  BAC  influence  their  willingness  to  choose  risky 
lotteries with real monetary  incentives. The use of self‐estimated BAC allows us  to 
monetarily incentivize the elicitation of an individual´s self‐perceived intoxication by 
rewarding  subjects’  correct  guesses  about  their  own  BAC  levels.  In  addition,  self‐








about  the  risk  or  negative  consequences  involved  by  choices  across  subjects.  By 
implementing  a  simple  lottery  task  we  manage  to  reduce  the  effect  of  impaired 
cognitive  abilities  due  to  alcohol  intoxication  on  subjects’  decision  making.  In 
addition  to  that, we  increase  outcome  variance  along  different  lotteries  and  keep 
the  expected  value  constant,  positive,  and  easily  computable  across  them.  In  this 
way,  the differences between choices are uniquely based on  the  risk  involved and 
not  on  different  levels  of  long‐term  profitability  (i.e.,  how  comparatively  adaptive 
the options are), learning or other required abilities. Lastly, given the field nature of 
our  study,  important  environmental  and  individual  features  that  may  mediate  or 
interact with the effects of alcohol over risk‐taking are accounted for. 
We find that both measured and self‐estimated BAC levels impact negatively 
over  the  subjects’  willingness  to  choose  riskier  lotteries.  However,  at  high 
intoxication levels subjects tend to underestimate their own BAC, and the degree of 
such  underestimation  goes  along with  increasing  the  riskiness  of  choices  for male 
and  young  subjects.  Thus,  our  findings  suggest  that  individuals  take  lower  risks 
insofar  as  they  consciously  perceive  their  intoxication  level  to  be  high.  This might 
work  as  a  proximate  mechanism  for  compensating  the  psychomotor  impairment 
triggered by  intoxication  (Burian et  al.  2003). Compensatory patterns  after  alcohol 
exposure  have  been  reported  in  other  behavioral  tasks  (Gustafson  and  Källmén 
1990;  Finnigan  et  al.  1995).  Therefore,  engagement  in  risky  behaviors  associated 
with alcoholic intoxication seems to be due to the impaired ability to evaluate risks 
and/or  the  negative  consequences  of  choices  when  such  impairment  is  not 
sufficiently  compensated  for  as  a  result  of  an  inadequately  self‐perceived 
intoxication level. Of major interest is the case of young and male individuals. Youth 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Ordered Logistic Regressions excluding Outliers 
Dep. Variable:          Main effects           Interaction effects 
lottery choice (2) (3) (5) (6) 
BAC     
eBAC -1.560** (0.684)  
-5.489** 
(2.434)  
underBAC  0.396 (0.710)  
5.498 
(3.42) 
BAC x male     
eBAC x age   0.131* (0.078)  
underBAC x male    6.077*** (1.848) 
underBAC x age     -0.325*** (0.117) 















































party ses. x male     -3.138** (1.386) 
observations 68 53 68 53 
LR (chi2) 20.62** 19.38** 23.75*** 40.59*** 
pseudo R2 0.0926 0.1117 0.1066 0.2339 
 
Table  S1:  The  impact of BAC and  self‐estimated BAC over  the 
willingness  to  take  risk.  Ordered  Logistic  Regressions.  eBAC 
outliers  are  excluded. We  consider  outliers  those  observations 
situated three or more standard deviations from the mean. For 
eBAC  (but  not  for  BAC)  two  observations  are  classified  as 
outliers.  Standard  errors  in  brackets.  *,  **,  ***  indicate 







Dep. Variable: Ordinary Least Squares 
underBAC All Males Females 
BAC 0.640***      (0.145) 
0.744***      
(0.180) 
0.553*      
(0.287) 
male 0.061 (0.174) 



































observations 55 34 21 
F 3.96*** 4.85*** 1.28 
R2 0.4077 0.5663 0.4081 
 
Table  S2:  Understimation  (underBAC)  of  one’s  own 
BAC. OLS  regressions.  Standard  errors  in  brackets.  *, 
**, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels,  respectively.  The  sample  is  reduced  to  those 
subjects who  declared  having  ingested  alcohol  before 
the  experiment.  Due  to  the  reduced  sample  size  no 
interaction  effects  are  added  to  the  model.  Age2  is 
excluded since it was found to be insignificant.  
